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The Looming Ottawa Deadlines
Under Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,1 States Parties are bound by a 10-year 
mine-clearance deadline. As the first clearance deadlines approach in March 2009, it is evident 
that several countries will not be able to meet their Ottawa-imposed deadlines. 
by Kateland shane [ Mine Action Information Center]
Mines Advisory Group community-liaison staff present a mine- and unexploded ordnance-risk education session with children from the primary school in Magwi, south sudan.
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Off the coast of Argentina lies the United Kingdom-controlled territory2 of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. These beautiful islands are a 
popular tourist destination and home to many rare spe-
cies of wildlife. While they may appear peaceful, a 1982 
conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina 
over the territory has left the islands contaminated with 
unexploded ordnance, booby traps and landmines. In 
fact, the British government estimates 101–120 mine-
fields are within this territory.3 
The mines do not pose an immediate threat—
fields are marked and fenced, and there have been no 
human casualties since 1982—but the United King-
dom is a State Party to the Ottawa Convention. It is 
therefore bound by Article 5 of the Convention to de-
stroy all anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction 
or control by 1 March 2009. Although its deadline 
is 2009, the United Kingdom has not begun formal 
clearance operations; moreover, it has not even devel-
oped a plan for clearance.3 
The United Kingdom is not alone in its lack of com-
pliance. According to the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines, 18 States Parties4 with deadlines in 
2009 still have not fulfilled their Article 5 obligations.5 Fifteen 
of those countries—including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, 
Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen and 
Zimbabwe—will not be able to complete their obligations by 
the 2009 clearance deadline and have submitted a request for 
more time.6 
Under Article 5, States Parties that cannot meet their obliga-
tions have the option to apply for an extension. Even if granted an 
extension, there is debate over whether some of these countries 
will be able to complete clearance within the extended time.  
What is hindering parties from fulfilling their Article 5 ob-
ligations? Some States Parties are citing major obstacles, such as 
ongoing conflict, as the reason for missing the deadlines, while 
many other parties simply failed to set up clearance operations 
in a timely manner or at all.5 Campaigners for the Ottawa Con-
vention fear that because so many will miss the first deadlines, 
those in noncompliance are setting a poor precedent for par-
ties with future deadlines. Supporters warn that parties need to 
start taking their obligations more seriously.7 
Article 5 Obligations
Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention concerns the “destruc-
tion of anti-personnel mines in mined areas.” The three main 
obligations of States Parties under Article 5 are to:
1. “destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, 
as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the 
entry into force” of the Convention.8
2. “identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in 
which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to 
be emplaced.” 9 
3. “ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control 
are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fenc-
ing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of 
civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained there-
in have been destroyed.”9
Paragraph 1 of Article 5 sets forth the 10-year deadline for 
States Parties to complete destruction of all AP mines under 
their jurisdiction or control. In June 2008, Uganda announced it 
would meet its deadline and Niger said it was not mine affected.4 
Djibouti indicated a couple years ago that it no longer has Article 
5 obligations.4,10 Sixteen States Parties with 2009 deadlines still 
have obligations under Article 5.10 
With the first deadlines fast approaching, 15 States Parties 
(all but Uganda) may not be able to meet their 2009 deadlines 
and have to use the deadline extension provision in Article 5 to 
request additional time to finish mine clearance. 
Extension Process
Article 5.3 states that each extension request must include:
•	 “the duration of the proposed extension” 
•	 “a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed 
extension” 
•	 “the humanitarian, social, economic and environmental 
implications of the extension”
•	 “any other information relevant to the request for the 
proposed extension”11
After a State Party submits a request for extension, either 
the Review Conference or the Meeting of the States Parties will 
determine by majority vote whether to grant the extension. Par-
ties are encouraged to submit extension requests no later than 
nine months before the Review Conference or Meeting of the 
States Parties at which the decision for extension is made. Since 
the 9th Meeting of the States Parties was held in November 2008, 
this request should have been made in late February 2008 for 
those with 2009 deadlines. Parties were asked to also submit 
their national demining plans and a two-to-five page executive 
summary with the request.11 Parties that miss clearance dead-
lines will be in violation of the Convention until they submit an 
extension request.5
Extension Requests
Fifteen States Parties have submitted deadline extension 
requests: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, 
Thailand, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe.6 
Prior to the 9MSP, the Ottawa Convention’s Implementation 
Support Unit, located at the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining in Geneva, Switzerland, reported that 
“the only State Party with a deadline in 2009 that has not yet 
either submitted an extension request or indicated completion, 
is expected to announce completion in 2009.”10
Parties have cited various reasons for missing deadlines, in-
cluding insufficient resources, poor minefield records and envi-
ronmental challenges; however, other States Parties, such as the 
United Kingdom and Denmark, did not start clearance opera-
tions on time or at all. The ICBL reports that “delays in setting 
up mine action centers, developing strategies and plans, mobi-
lizing resources and engaging in clearance were responsible for 
many missed deadlines.”5 
Some countries that have submitted extension requests are 
still heavily affected by landmines that threaten their human-
itarian, environmental and socioeconomic livelihoods. For 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Thailand and Yemen, land-
mines continue to be a serious problem, one that will probably 
not be solved for another five to 10 years. Other States Parties 
that have applied for deadline extensions do not have exten-
sive mine problems and should have finished clearance already. 
Countries such as the United Kingdom (Falkland/Malvinas 
Islands), Denmark and Venezuela have manageable landmine 
contaminations but still applied for extensions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mine contamination in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina resulted from the 1992–95 conflict during the 
breakup of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. As a result of 
that conflict, Bosnia is one of the most mine-affected countries 
in the world and is the most mine-affected country in Europe. 
Demining officials have submitted a request for a 10-year 
deadline extension. BiH originally had a goal of 2009 for finish-
ing clearance operations; now, they are requesting an extension 
mainly due to lack of funding and the large scope of the mine 
problem. In the request, authorities point to poor minefield 
records and a shortened demining season due to climate as ob-
stacles to clearance. At the end of 2007, 3.42 percent of the total 
land in Bosnia was still affected by mines, with 921,513 people 
directly affected. BiH presented a revised plan that would ren-
der the country mine-free by 2019.12 
Croatia. Croatia also suffered a widespread mine problem 
from conflicts that occurred during the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
Although Croatia has identified and marked all suspected or 
known mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, mines and 
UXO still affect 12 of 21 counties, inhibiting socioeconomic de-
velopment. Croatia has submitted a request for an extension of 
10 years to its 1 March 2009 deadline. In the report, Croatia lists 
several reasons for its request, including environmental chal-
lenges, inaccurate and incomplete minefield records and a UXO 
problem that also needs immediate attention. The remaining 
total mine-suspected area in Croatia is 997 square kilometers 
(385 square miles). Croatia has presented a new plan in which it 
will gradually increase its capacity and clear the remaining sus-
pected areas by 2019.13
Thailand. The mine contamination in Thailand lies most-
ly in border communities. Last year, the Landmine Monitor 
reported that Thailand had cleared less than 1 percent of the 
mine-contaminated area identified during its 2001 Landmine 
Impact Survey.14 As of September 2008, through new survey 
work, Thailand estimates that there are really only 527 square 
kilometers (89 square miles) that remain contaminated.4 
Thailand is requesting a nine-and-a-half year extension to its 
2009 deadline, during which time the Thailand Mine Action 
Center plans to cooperate with local nongovernmental organi-
zations on clearance. Deminers expect to finish clearance by 1 No-
vember 2018. The request acknowledged that previous methods 
of mine clearance were too slow. In 2006, Thailand reported em-
ploying a new method, called “Locating Minefield Procedure,” 
which resulted in “dramatically accelerated” clearance through 
release of land not found to be contaminated.4,15
Yemen. This country is affected by mines and other explosive 
remnants of war16 as a result of several conflicts during 1962–69, 
1970–83 and 1994. A survey in July 2000 identified 1,078 mined 
areas. As of April 2008, Yemen still has 447 mined areas. Land-
mines in Yemen have killed and injured thousands, and block ac-
cess to land that could be used for agricultural or socioeconomic 
development and for oil production. Only 2.6 percent of the land 
in Yemen is arable and the presence of landmines further limits 
the amount of tillable land. Yemen has applied for a deadline 
extension of six years. The deadline extension request identi-
fies financial shortfalls and technical obstacles as the primary 
reasons for missing the 2009 deadline. The Yemen Mine Ac-
tion Centre predicts that Yemen will be mine-free by Septem-
ber 2014.17 
The United Kingdom. The only mined areas under the con-
trol or jurisdiction of the United Kingdom are in the Falkland/
Malvinas Islands. While all mined areas have been identified, 
marked and fenced, the United Kingdom has not started clear-
ance operations. In 2001, the United Kingdom worked with 
Argentina, which also claims jurisdiction over the islands, to 
conduct a mine-clearance feasibility study of the islands. The 
study confirmed that there were multiple environmental and 
climatic challenges to demining.18 In 2005, the United Kingdom 
also encountered strong resistance among the inhabitants of the 
islands to conducting clearance operations. Islanders told The 
Guardian that they did not want precious funds and demining 
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States Parties in November 2008. Whether or not these coun-
tries were granted an extension, the 15 States Parties that have 
applied still face serious mine problems. The humanitarian and 
financial costs of the remaining landmines are great. 
Not all States Parties with 2009 deadlines will fail to com-
plete clearance on time. For instance, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, 
France, Djibouti, FYR Macedonia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Malawi, Swaziland and Suriname have already fulfilled Article 
5 clearance obligations.4, 11 Deadline extension request notwith-
standing, the Ottawa Convention’s Implementation Support 
Unit reports that two of the 16 remaining parties with obliga-
tions will most likely finish clearance within the specified time: 
Niger and Uganda.11 The countries that have completed their 
obligations demonstrate to the world that it is possible to be-
come mine-free within the allotted 10-year period.
See Endnotes, page 112
This article was researched and written prior to 9MSP. The 
Journal has freshened where possible the content prior to publish-
ing. For more up-to-date information about Ottawa extensions, 
see “The Article 5 Extension Request Process” by Tamar Gabelnick 
on the following page.
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The Article 5 Extension 
Request Process
by Tamar Gabelnick 
[ International Campaign to Ban Landmines ]
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines was very specific in saying that there were to be no 
exceptions to the 10-year deadline placed in the Ottawa Convention.1 However, with the Convention’s 
first mine-clearance deadline quickly approaching in 2009, at least 15 countries have found they 
may have bitten off more than they can chew. Or have they? 
resources used to clear their land, since the mined areas were 
fenced off and did not pose a threat to human life.19 According to 
an article by the Falkland Islands News Network in 2008, how-
ever, it was wrongly reported previously that the inhabitants 
were against demining because they didn’t want lots of strang-
ers on the Islands while demining was being done; “[f]ew peo-
ple would object to the positive [e]ffect on the economy if a large 
number of people came to help with demining.”20 The United 
Kingdom has requested a deadline extension of 10 years to clear 
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.18 At the Intersessional Standing 
Committee Meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 June 2008, the 
United Kingdom stated, “Let there be no doubt that the [United 
Kingdom] takes all its obligations under the Ottawa Convention 
extremely seriously.”21 The United Kingdom explained that un-
dertaking demining operations in the Falklands could have neg-
ative environmental and socioeconomic consequences.21 
Denmark. Most of the landmines in Denmark have been 
cleared, and only a small mined area remains in the marshes and 
dunes of the peninsula of Skallingen, left behind from World 
War II. Authorities in Denmark report that the remote area has 
been fenced and no mine-related casualties have been recorded 
since 1946. In its deadline-extension request, Denmark claims 
that the delicate nature of the environment of Skallingen has 
prevented it from moving forward with clearance operations. 
Denmark states that clearance operations would risk “irrepara-
ble damage” to the environment without careful planning.22 
Venezuela. Although it became party to the Ottawa Conven-
tion in 1999, according to the Landmine Monitor, Venezuela is 
still using AP mines and expects to miss its 2009 deadline. In 
2007, Venezuela stated that it continues to employ AP mines to 
protect its naval bases from Colombian insurgents. Only a small 
amount of mine contamination remains, but Venezuela submit-
ted a deadline extension request.23 
Looking Ahead
The Ottawa Convention has certainly been a powerful force for 
mine action in the international community. Since the entry into 
force of the Convention, production of anti-personnel mines has 
decreased and the trade of AP mines is almost non-existent. Mil-
lions of mines have been destroyed, and hundreds of square kilo-
meters of land have been freed of landmine contamination. Indeed, 
the Ottawa Convention has been called a “success in progress,”24 
and 156 states have become parties to it, pledging to never use, pro-
duce, transfer, develop, retain or stockpile anti-personnel mines.25
The Convention has been successful, but it risks losing its effica-
cy because it appears that States Parties are not taking their obliga-
tions seriously enough, whether or not that may be the case. 
Tamar Gabelnick of the ICBL believes that some countries need 
to rethink their approach to their Article 5 obligations. “For some 
countries, there needs to be a much greater effort on the part of 
the national authorities to prioritize clearance and work more effi-
ciently. Though the work is always challenging, where there is a will, 
there is a way.” 4, 5 She recommends that those parties make more of 
an effort to mobilize resources to get the work done as soon as pos-
sible. Other parties do not have accurate estimates of the contami-
nation level. According to the ICBL, such parties should conduct 
Technical and non-Technical Surveys first to determine the scope of 
the problem. Countries will then be able to develop national mine-
action strategies better after assessing the situation.5
It is not guaranteed that all States Parties that apply for ex-
tensions will receive them. The decision for each State Party that 
requested an extension was made during the 9th Meeting of the 
When the Ottawa Convention was being negotiated in 1997, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines called for a text with “no exceptions, no reservations, 
and no loopholes.” The result was a treaty that was remarkably 
simple and straightforward, including with regards to mine clear-
ance. Under Article 5, mine-affected States Parties have a clear 
duty to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas as soon 
as possible, but no later than 10 years after joining the treaty. The 
link between the treaty’s humanitarian and 
disarmament objectives is equally clear; the 
sooner the mines are taken out of the ground 
and destroyed, the sooner people can farm the 
land, use grazing pastures, gather wood, walk 
to markets and schools, and engage in count-
less other essential activities safely again. The 
longer it takes to clear mined areas along bor-
ders or around security installations, the longer 
a State Party may be continuing to make mili-
tary or strategic use of the mines. 
Despite the urgent need to remove em-
placed mines for humanitarian and/or dis-
armament purposes, there is a possibility of 
requesting one or more extensions to the 10-
year deadline. Mine-affected states that be-
came parties to the Convention in 1999 face 
their mine-clearance deadlines in 2009, and 
those that do not expect to finish on time 
were required to request an extension at the 
9th Meeting of the States Parties in November 
2008. Fifteen countries, or about two-thirds of 
the original group with 2009 deadlines, will 
seek such an extension.2 The extension-request 
process has therefore been one of the hot topics of 2008 as States 
Parties and other interested actors grappled with how to handle 
the requests in a way that would respect the intent of the treaty 
and set the best possible precedent for future requests. 
The History of the Extension-request Process
The extension-request story does not begin with the 2008 
meeting, however, but rather in 1997, when the Ottawa Con-
vention was drafted. During the negotiations, states, the ICBL, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross and other par-
ticipants discussed at length the question of how many years 
States Parties should be given to clear mined areas, or indeed 
whether there should be a deadline at all.3 It was eventually rec-
ognized that without the impetus of a legally binding deadline, 
the clearance work could drag on indefinitely, which would not 
be in keeping with the convention’s intent. 
At the same time, states understood that in some cases—
because of the sheer quantity of mined areas or other extraordi-
nary circumstances—certain mine-affected states would need 
more than 10 years to clear their land. The original proposed 
text, put forward by the ICRC, was that the extension should be 
“the minimum necessary, but in no case shall the extension ex-
ceed five years.”4 Ultimately, the text was changed to allow for up 
to 10 additional years, which would be renewable. States Parties 
requesting more time would have to provide a detailed rationale 
for the extension, and other States Parties must assess and vote 
on the request. The understanding remained, however, that such 
extensions should be the exception, not the rule.
The extension issue was then put aside for many years while 
States Parties focused on how to complete mine-clearance 
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